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Ab s t r A c t
The aim of this study is to develop from Kristeva’s account of time and 
semiotics the conditions of possibility for a new approach to interpreting 
the Bible. This will be set against the background of feminist biblical criti-
cism, beginning from Esther Fuchs’s assessment of deception. She bases 
her comparison on the concept of deceptiveness but I will argue, using La-
can, that the aporia of desire undermines this comparison. Through Kris-
teva’s framework of the phases of feminism it will be shown that Fuchs’s 
argument weakness lies in her presupposition of the determinate identities 
of men and women. By examining passages in Genesis it will be shown 
that such determined identities are also not easily found in the Hebrew 
Bible. Then by considering another feminist scholar, Alice Bach, it will be 
shown that overcoming identity requires a more nuanced approach. In the 
first version of “Women’s Time” Kristeva suggests that identities could be 
overcome through moving towards the individual but this also operates in 
the same structure of identity. In fact Kristeva appears to recognize this 
problem as when she republishes the essay she considers a different way 
forward. It will be instead suggested that a type of feminism that recog-
nizes its own weakness is needed. This will be used to interpret Proverbs 
31 but in doing so it will become evident that this alone lacks the potency 
to overcome the diffuse nature of the symbolic. 
Ab s t r A c t




TIntroductIonThis paper will argue that Julia Kristeva’s theory of semiotic/symbolic re-lation has deep reaching consequences for attempts at creative interpreta-tions of literature.1 It will be shown, by developing Kristeva’s account of semiotics, that authority is incredulously used in the work of Ester Fuchs 
and Alice Bach. Esther Fuchs argues that “from Eve to Esther, from Re-
bekah to Ruth, the characterisation of women in the Hebrew Bible pre-
sents deceptiveness as an almost inescapable feature of femininity” (“Who 
Is Hiding the Truth?” 137). Her phrase “characterisation of women” is 
a concept adopted from literary criticism and she conceives a literary char-
acter as produced by the author. This will be challenged through Kristeva, 
who highlights the vulnerability of the concept of identity in “Women’s 
Time.” The weakness of a method presupposing identity, based on an es-
sentialist notion of femininity, will be shown through re-examining the 
passages in the Book of Genesis used by Fuchs. The extent of the prob-
lem of identity includes the interpretation of Alice Bach, another feminist 
biblical scholar, who has an awareness of this problem. Her approach of 
rejecting identity fails because she does not recognize a similarly function-
ing determinacy in her own interpretation. 
This problem will then be applied to Kristeva’s own attempts at re-
solving the problem. The first resolution she proposes is to move towards 
recognizing individuality. However, as Kathy Ehrensperger has correctly 
observed, this approach falls into the same trap that it attempts to over-
come. In fact, Kristeva seems to appreciate this, as she omits this section 
in the revised version of “Women’s Time.” Instead she concludes with a re-
flection on the possibility of a feminism that is aware of its own shortfalls. 
Her concluding reflection will be developed in parallel to her “Reading the 
Bible” to indicate how fantasy might be developed to provide a new way 
forward. However, this will not be sufficient to overcome the power of the 
symbolic.
1 I  would like to acknowledge the help of Catrin Williams and David Hazell for 
their comments and feedback in the development of this essay. An earlier version appeared 
in The Student Researcher: Journal of Undergraduate Research (University of Wales Trinity 
Saint David, Sept. 2011).
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the Problem of desIre
Ester Fuchs’s perception of inequality in the Hebrew Bible is based on the 
inequality of the satisfaction of desire. She argues that women’s deception 
in the Bible is mitigated by their lower status of power. The premise here 
is that desire can only be satisfied if someone has the power to achieve 
their “wishes” (“Who Is Hiding the Truth?” 138). Women in the Hebrew 
Bible are presented as deceivers through the literary devices of the author 
that, Fuchs claims, supported patriarchy within the author’s surrounding 
culture. The Biblical narratives represent a contradiction; women are not 
given power due to their social standing, and yet, within the narrative, they 
are portrayed as wielding power. Their power must then arise from decep-
tive means and thus Fuchs argues that this deception balances the inherent 
oppression from their society (“Who Is Hiding the Truth?” 137). 
She illustrates this through the story of Rebekah deceiving her husband 
Isaac, in order for her favourite son Jacob to receive the blessing rather 
than Esau, her eldest son (Genesis 27). If Rebekah had equal standing to 
Isaac, she could have achieved her goal through legitimate means without 
resorting to disguising Jacob to look like his brother Esau. The focus of 
Fuchs’s interpretation is the worldly consequences of Rebekah’s deception, 
in terms of whether men or women can achieve their desire. It follows that 
Rebekah’s deception would produce a satisfactory conclusion for her, given 
that she achieves her desire for Jacob to receive the birthright. 
However, Fuchs must assume that, behind the imbalance between 
men and women, is the principle that men can satisfy their desire through 
power. In contrast, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan shows that 
the fulfilment of desire is impossible because what is desired has already 
been lost. He situates the origin of desire in the child’s break with the 
mother. When the child is thrown into the world, language stands between 
the child’s needs and their fulfilment (Kesel 27). In order to express her 
desire in language, the child must be incorporated into the system of lan-
guage, and she must accept the linguistic order. In language, the child must 
find satisfaction and so has to settle for a linguistic substitute. This is illus-
trated when Lacan considers the problem of the declaration: “I have three 
brothers, Paul, Ernest and me” (20, italics in original). The ambiguity of this 
is that each person can be called a brother and so it seems, by addition, that 
the total should be three. Instead the practice of omitting the subject in 
such reckoning produces an inconsistency. This inconsistency reveals that 
the child has to perform two functions as both subject and object, even 
though these are contradictory roles. 
It also illustrates how the other’s desire (as objet petit a) is a concern 
for the child. In language the child must understand itself as an object for 
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the other (I am his brother) and consequently the other is also understood 
as desiring. This separation between the other’s expectation and primal 
experiences creates a division between the child and pleasure because the 
satisfaction is both subjective and objective (I require pleasure and I as his 
brother require pleasure). In this way Lacan (and following him, Kristeva) 
develop Freudian theory beyond its biological basis and instead integrate 
language as the basis for our experience. 
Applying this to Israelite culture, Rebekah’s actions symbolize a “re-
turn” to the Garden of Eden. At the beginning of the book of Genesis, 
humankind was created in a good world from which humankind was sepa-
rated after rebelling against God (Genesis 2–3). The Garden represents 
a lost world in which pleasure was immediate but has now been lost. In the 
Lacanian framework, its significance is found in what it represents within 
the social structure. Mankind could never return to the Garden and so it 
is a symbol of the satisfaction of desire in the Biblical narrative. Jacob’s 
birthright involved the promise of the land of plenitude, which symbol-
izes the lost Garden of Eden. Rebekah’s ambition for her favourite son to 
receive the blessing is ultimately not satisfied because her desire is to be in 
the Garden and, as such, Jacob receives land as a substitute for returning to 
the Garden. Thus male characters also experience the loss of desire. Their 
desire is not only experienced subjectively but is also produced through 
the experience of being an object for the other. 
Indeed Jacob’s desire for the birthright is also the desire of his brother, 
Esau. The winning of the birthright produces the utterances—for Jacob, “I 
have the birthright,” and for Esau, “my brother has the birthright.” Jacob 
is both subject and object and so his satisfaction is not immediate but set 
in the face of a lack of desire. With or without deception, Rebekah’s ac-
tions fail to overcome the problem of desire. In other words, the failure 
of Rebekah’s deception is that she accepts the possibility of the fulfilment 
of desire rather than recognizing the negativity within desire itself (see 
Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language 127–32). This means Isaac does 
not possess the ability to satisfy his own desire, which makes the claim that 
Isaac does not need to deceive in order to get his wishes incoherent. It is 
a projection of the feminist reading of the story that Isaac dominates the 
story. Instead, the narrative is decentred, because there is no ultimate satis-
faction of desire that can only be found in the Garden of Eden. Rebekah’s 
desire is not only “woman’s” desire, and it cannot ever be truly satisfied 
under the universal problem of temporality. 
This is not to say that “men” and “women” have the same desires; 
only that humanity shares the separation from pleasure, which makes the 
satisfaction of desire impossible. Rebekah’s desire can never be satisfied 
because her desire is misplaced. She focuses her desire on Jacob rather than 
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recognizing her unobtainable desire for the Garden. Therefore Fuchs does 
not recognize that, in either receiving or not receiving the blessing, there 
can be no ultimate satisfaction of desire.
JulIa KrIsteva’s Phases of femInIsm
In “Women’s Time,” Kristeva divides feminism into three phases.2 These 
phases are developed from exploring the relationship between time and 
identity; “female subjectivity would seem to provide a  specific measure 
that essentially retains repetition and eternity from among the multiple 
modalities of time known through the history of civilisations” (Kristeva, 
“Women’s Time” 16/205, italics in original). 
“Repetition” is experienced in the passage of time. When one moment 
passes into the next, the moment is repeated; although, as illuminated by 
Henri Lefebvre, this does not mean that each moment is the same: “Not 
only does repetition not exclude differences, it also gives birth to them; it 
produces them” (Lefebvre 7). The difference produced by rhythm con-
trasts with the time of eternity, since the difference in repetition means 
that a particular occurrence cannot be reproduced. The repetition of the 
passing of time makes the original lost in the passage of the moment; as 
Heraclitus famously asked whether someone could ever step in the same 
river twice. Other visible examples of this can be found in the rhythmic 
structure of nature, such as the repetition of the sun rising and setting or 
the cycle of the seasons. Repetition would be eternal but for the interrup-
tion of death and thus repetition is finite. 
The contrasting mode of time is eternity, which “has so little to do 
with linear time (which passes) that the very word ‘temporality’ hardly 
fits” (Kristeva, “Women’s Time” 16/205). The time of eternity cannot be 
described as “temporal” because it is not the time of human experience. 
The time of human experience is defined by our finitude; we experience 
time through a beginning in birth and an end in death. Instead temporality 
is time as directly experienced by us with a beginning and an end. We can-
not understand eternity because we have a beginning and an ending. The 
problem of eternal time meeting humanity is revealed in what Kristeva 
describes as the “media revolution” (“Women’s Time” 18/206). The need 
for constant storage of information presupposes that experience can be 
2 This essay was originally published in French in 1979 in Cahiers de recherche de 
sciences des textes et documents. An updated version of this essay was then included in Les 
Nouvelles maladies de l’âme. Pagination will be in the first English translation followed by 
the version in New Maladies of the Soul. Each version has a subtly distinct tone, which will 
be noted when these differences interrupt my line of argument.
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 condensed and its presence maintained in, for example, the video record-
ing or a cloning machine. Thus the modality of eternity supposes that eve-
rything can be sufficiently reproduced without loss, but it cannot account 
for the passage of time (repetition).
The first phase of feminism categorized by Kristeva was the political 
response to the oppression of women (“Women’s Time” 18–19/207–08). 
This movement is grounded in the passage of time through history (rhyth-
mic time), but appropriates a universal category of “woman.” Here woman 
is an amalgamated identity that is applied to all women, in the belief that 
history would reach an end of equality through the passage of time. The 
movement of the suffragettes is the foremost example of this phase. The 
characteristic of this type was concern for the practical effects of oppres-
sion, which presupposed that, by addressing the symptom, the cause of 
women’s oppression would also be cured. However, the practical emphasis 
of this phase means that it would not be the primary category for feminist 
approaches to the Bible but could nevertheless show, in the style of Fou-
cault, that feminism could be conceived otherwise.
Kristeva traces the second wave of feminism back to 1968. Feminists 
were more focused around this time on the psychological experiences of 
women and sought to challenge the domination of patriarchal symbols. 
In this generation “linear temporality has been almost totally refused, and 
as a  consequence there has arisen an exacerbated distrust of the entire 
political dimension” (“Women’s Time” 19/208). Here she observes that 
in the face of the failure to achieve equality through particular practical 
movements, feminism attempted to address the issue at its roots in culture 
on the basis that only when the foundations of the current inequality are 
quashed will equality be achieved. The rejection of rhythmic time has to 
depend on a more concrete concept of identity, as identity is equivocated 
with a person’s being. This process incorporates reading historically sig-
nificant texts from a “feminist” perspective in order to highlight women’s 
oppression. 
History is reinterpreted through the identity of “woman” in order to 
highlight historical oppression. The historical re-reading approach that is 
the signature of this phase shares the feminist biblical criticism of Fuchs. 
This movement only projects one identity, of woman, and anything falling 
outside would be disregarded as not significant for progressing emancipa-
tion. The problem is that “woman” does not take account of differences 
within this identity, such as the identity of “mother.” Kristeva explains 
this through the relationship between the semiotic and symbolic, in which 
the semiotic is defined as the meta-grammatical effect of language and 
the symbolic is defined as the functioning of language within a system of 
grammar or rules. She claims that the symbolic is the attempt to determine 
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the biological order of things, although the essence of the biological is 
chaotic, or beyond determination (Revolution 17). In the face of this chaos 
we create symbols that grant us a certainty within order against the on-
set of chaos. The symbolic emerges from separation between the signifier 
and the signified. This is the process of The Mirror Stage, as developed by 
Lacan. The image is the signified which is incorporated by the ego over-
lapping the signifier of the subject (Kristeva, Revolution 46–51). Kristeva 
develops this, through Frege’s “denoting,” as an example of the symbolic, 
which produces certainty by not referring to any real object (Revolution 
53). However, Kristeva objects to this system of denotation by arguing 
that it hides the fact that it is caught in tension between the signifier and 
signified. The notion of identity follows this structure, whereby it can only 
determine someone insofar as characteristics that do not fit into the iden-
tity are excluded. 
This is exemplified in Fuchs’s attempt to redeem the character of Re-
bekah. She argues that the deception lies not in her character but elsewhere, 
that is, in the inequality between men and women in Israelite society. The 
presupposition of this approach is its conception of time, in that it is only 
possible to judge “deception” in historical texts by claiming an eternal, or 
transcendental, perspective. A judge has to step back from the immediate 
temporal rhythm and evaluate each side from a neutral position, with the 
concern not for the immediate restraint of abuse but with the balance of 
justice. These transcendental foundations suppress the semiotic dimension 
in language. When Fuchs attempts to resituate deception in inequality, she 
has to assume that it is the only stumbling block to desire. The problem of 
desire shows that her basis is not eternal, but totalized, because she does 
not consider the validity of desire itself. 
Applied to feminism, temporality restricts the optimism of recog-
nition, as succinctly put by Penelope Deutscher: “Feminism might have 
to renounce its confidence in progress and the supposition that history 
moves, all going well, from a less feminist past to a more feminist future” 
(48). On this basis, feminist interpretation of history, including the Bible, 
is undermined by the temporal positioning of interpretation. Kristeva de-
scribes the problem as a “radical refusal of subjective limitations imposed 
by this history’s time in the name of the irreducible difference” (“Women’s 
Time” 20, italics in original).3 This is also the case with Fuchs’s presuppo-
sition that men are fully satisfied in achieving their desire, whereas wom-
en are restrained by society. Time is universal to human experience and 
3 This section is omitted from the later version of the essay and replaced by the 
rhetorical questions: “What socio-political processes or events have led to this mutation? 
What are its problems, its contributions, its limits?” (New Maladies 208).
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so  desire, as temporal, can never be fulfilled. For example, both men and 
women in Israelite culture were outside of Eden and desired to “return” to 
the garden. This is not a return as “turning back on oneself ” but desire of 
being in the garden for the very first time (and impossible because of the 
difference produced by repetition).
IdentIty In the hebrew bIble
The feminist approach adopted by Esther Fuchs would be justified if the 
Hebrew Bible could be shown to, as a whole, employ a determined identity 
of “woman.” Deceptiveness as a feature of femininity could then be deter-
mined, because the identification of femininity is an intrinsic part of the 
text itself. However, this section will contrast the presentation of “wom-
en” in the Book of Proverbs to the presentation of women in the examples 
used by Fuchs, in order to show that the Hebrew Bible cannot be so clearly 
characterized as representing “women” as deceptive. Feminist criticism 
will be, instead, reconstructed in the light of rhythmic temporality.
In the story of Isaac’s deception, there is no identification of “wom-
an.” In Genesis 27 Rebekah is referred to either as Rebekah (vv. 5, 6, 
15) or as Isaac’s mother (vv. 13–14). This suggests that she is depicted 
in the text as an individual character and not as a  representative of all 
women. This description does not merely ignore Rebekah’s identity as 
“woman,” but instead defines how she should be characterized. The con-
nection between “mother” and “Rebekah” emphasizes the relationship 
that is of importance for the narrative. This lends itself to Kristeva’s ac-
count, because Rebekah is described in terms of her motherhood, rather 
than in generalized terms as “woman.” The combination of “Rebekah” 
and “mother” establishes their combined significance for the framework 
of the narrative.
Fuchs also argues that the author uses different standards to judge 
the deceits of men and women, thereby demonstrating that the author 
is producing a  patriarchal text (“Who Is Hiding the Truth?” 143–44). 
Through the illustration of Potiphar’s wife, who seduces the young Joseph 
in Egypt (Genesis 39), Fuchs argues that monogamy applied only to the 
wife (“Who Is Hiding the Truth?” 139). The husband may seduce other 
maid-servants without recrimination, but if his wife were to have an af-
fair it would not have been accepted. She argues that deception would not 
have been reported by the narrator had Potiphar deceived someone after 
seducing a maid-servant. The evidence for women’s oppression is found in 
the lack of the recording of male deception or seduction; a claim which she 
supports by citing Roland de Vaux.
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However, Vaux does not explore the Israelite-Judaic context in quite 
such simplistic terms. He claims that, by the strict definition of the law, 
a  man only commits adultery if the woman is married or engaged (see 
Deuteronomy 22:22–24). He also states that a  “husband is exhorted to 
be faithful to his wife in [Proverbs] 5:15–19” (Vaux 37). The exhortation 
may not be a command in law but this does not reduce its effect. Instead, 
it indicates that the written law is not definitive. There is, as it were, an 
“unwritten” law to which a man is also subjected. This presents a conflict-
ing set of demands, which is similar to the way the child must reconcile 
the inconsistency of being a  subject and object (described above). The 
ambiguity between the mere statements of the law and other less formal 
expectations means that the structure of Israelite-Judaic culture is more 
complicated than assumed by Fuchs.4 She is not justified in the assumption 
that such culture was patriarchal because the difference between Proverbs 
and Deuteronomy leaves open the possibility that there may have been no 
unified position about the attitudes to women. 
Another prominent feminist biblical scholar, Alice Bach, uses a diffe-
rent approach to this narrative of Potiphar’s wife. She employs a concep-
tion of gender identity that reflects Kristeva’s critique of identity: “The 
emphasis on the constructedness of gender that initially drew me to this 
investigation has now led me to recognize the fluidity of gender itself ” 
(Bach 35). From this account of gender, Bach interprets biblical narrative 
in such a way that she emphasizes the narrator’s influence on the text. She 
argues that the narrator does not tell the story from the perspective of 
Potiphar’s wife, even though she is the central character (48). Although 
Bach displays an awareness of the ideology of the narrator embedded in 
the text, she does not overcome the inequality between men and women, 
but inverts the structure. This is evident in her description of how to ap-
proach the biblical narrative: “I can turn a deaf ear to the narrator’s voice. 
Then I substitute my own” (6). However, Kristeva’s emphasis on the semi-
otic means that the only way Bach could “substitute her own” would be to 
do so pre-linguistically. Yet this is impossible because she is from the first 
to the last moment analyzing a text.5 She does not have her “own voice” 
but one that is already incorporated into the multitude of voices, including 
4 The presence of conflicting demands may in fact be a part of the structure required 
to maintain patriarchy. The appearance of more favourable standards could distract 
from the dominant oppressive structure and consequently such favourable standards are 
consistent with patriarchy. However, the present argument merely claims that there is 
a greater complexity that needs to be taken into account.
5 Similarly, Fuchs claims, against Umberto Eco, that she is concerned with the power 
relations rather than “mechanics” (“For I Have the Way of Women” 69). However, her 
approach is all too closely dependent upon the semiotic theory she claims to rise above.
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the narrator’s. Bach appears to move beyond identity by recognizing the 
“constructedness” of gender but when she “substitutes her own voice” she 
ignores this in her own interpretation. This highlights the nuance required 
in developing a response to the problem of identity.
the future
The final phase of feminism that Kristeva sets out is a movement beyond 
the determinacy of identity in the first two phases of feminism. In the 
earliest version of “Women’s Time” she describes this possibility as one 
that, instead of universalizing a particular perspective, calls us to recognize 
the “singularity of each person” (Kristeva, “Women’s Time” 35, italics in 
original). The production of identity assimilates everything into categories 
that cannot fully represent each individual. However, Kathy Ehrensperger 
raises the objection against Kristeva that by appealing to the individual she 
is using a discourse of modernity (108–09).
Kristeva herself appears to recognize this problem in the later version 
of “Women’s Time,” in which the proposal of a movement towards indi-
viduality is omitted. Instead, she sees that sexual difference has become 
a less significant issue (New Maladies 222–23). The suggestion she makes 
as an envisioning of what the future could hold is for “an ethics aware of 
its own sacrificial order and thus retain[ing] part of the burden for each of 
its adherents” (New Maladies 223). This indicates that rather than a posi-
tive assertion of individuality the future might be more orientated through 
consciousness of limitation. 
 There is a similar line of argument developed by Kristeva in her essay 
“Reading the Bible,” which appeared in the same volume. She argues that, 
when reading the Bible, we should not seek the definitive and objective 
interpretation but recognize how encountering the text reveals and de-
velops our own perspective: “We should read the Bible one more time. To 
interpret it, of course, but also let it carve out a space for our own fantasies 
and interpretive delirium” (New Maladies 126). Kristeva’s use of the term 
“fantasy” does not mean that we should just read the Bible any way we 
want. Rather, the concept of fantasy is defined within its psychoanalytic 
context. It is not something pejorative that should be overcome in place 
of reality but is part of our understanding of reality itself, as she states 
elsewhere: “We all have fantasies; whether seductive or terrifying, this is 
inevitable” (Intimate Revolt 63). Fantasy is part of our understanding, such 
that thinking “without fantasy” we would only be convincing ourselves 
that we had overcome fantasy; in the same way that the temporal is for-
gotten through the appropriation of the eternal. Thus, fantasy could be 
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reconceived positively, as Kristeva does through its etymology: “What is 
fantasy? The Greek root—fae, faos, fos—expresses the notion of light and 
thus the fact of coming to light, shining, appearing, presenting, present-
ing oneself, representing oneself ” (Intimate Revolt 63). Hence, fantasy de-
scribes how something is illuminated in human understanding. 
When we consider the deceptiveness of women in the Hebrew Bible, 
we should be aware of how our own nature affects our understanding of 
these ancient texts. We must interpret from our desire for equality and 
from our perception of oppression. This forms the basis for interpretation, 
because it reveals our “moment” in time. To recognize our interpretation 
as fantasy does not require that it should be rejected, but it challenges the 
injustice of oppression through a process that is itself vulnerable. Thus the 
fantasy of deceptiveness in the Hebrew Bible recognizes oppression with-
out providing a solution based on a determination or certainty.
Against this point another of Ehrensperger’s objections against Kris-
teva comes into view. She argues that with no essential core to the sub-
ject, there is no grounding for action. The core to the subject describes 
something that provides a certainty from which actions can be grounded. 
Ehrensperger claims that Kristeva makes a determinate assertion about the 
absence of reality, in that the rejection of the subject asserts nothingness in 
its place (Ehrensperger 100). Without a “core to the subject” it seems that 
people cannot do anything, such as acting against injustice. The rejection 
of identity undermines any attempt to gain recognition for the oppression 
of women. 
However, Kristeva indicates that she does not want to make any such 
move that removes all distinction within subjectivity: “I am not simply 
suggesting a very hypothetical bisexuality which, even if it existed, would 
only, in fact, be the aspiration toward the totality of one of the sexes and 
thus an effacing of difference” (“Women’s Time” 34). This means that the 
subject cannot be determined, whereas identity determines the subject and 
so does not truly reflect the individual. Repetition produces diffe rences, 
while an identity reduces things to sameness. The indeterminacy of the 
subject is an effect of the production of differences through rhythmic 
time. Time dissolves the determination of identity so that it can then be 
said that there is no subject as contained in the identity of “woman.” 
The persistent rejection of identity would not reject the practical im-
pact of feminism, but reveals that any practical response is always incom-
plete. Instead the basis in rhythmic temporality requires that any particular 
position should be overcome. So, with respect to feminism, the question 
would become not whether to take action or not but how to reassess our 
position. This begs the question about what it means to read the Bible. 
It is not directly related to the emancipation of women but as Kristeva 
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observes in “Reading the Bible,” it nevertheless has a powerful influence 
(New Maladies 115–16). 
Proverbs 31 could provide us with an example of how fantasy can 
overcome oppression. King Lemuel is told not to submit to women be-
cause they will destroy him (Proverbs 31:3). It is set within the circum-
stance for the king and so could be read in relation to male fantasy. The 
verse discusses women as perceived by a king. The importance of the fan-
tasy is that it overcomes a spurious perspective of the infinite. By “giving 
strength” to women the king would give strength to the image of women 
that fills his own fantasy. Hence the description of “women” in Proverbs 
31:3 can be read as not referring to all women, but describing the danger of 
projecting an identity. The use of identity in this passage does not reflect 
the understanding set out by Fuchs. In Proverbs 31, the identity is contin-
gent and represents the limitation of human time. However, such a read-
ing of this passage does not overcome the problem of the symbolic. The 
word “women” is not restricted to such qualified contexts but is also used 
in an unqualified way. Thus “women” bears both qualified and unqualified 
meanings. It therefore remains possible to read the verse both ways. The 
symbolic is not attached to any particular thing but “floats” above and the 
authority that the symbol has is not undermined by re-interpreting only 
one usage. 
conclusIon
When we approach the Bible we should recognize our finitude. Fuchs ex-
emplified the problem of universalizing that offers a retrospective judge-
ment of characterization in the Hebrew Bible. In this study her presuppo-
sition of identifying “women” has been shown as vulnerable to Kristeva’s 
emphasis on ambiguity. Her response was distinguished from Bach’s in-
terpretation of women in the Hebrew Bible, which was shown to repeat 
the problem of oppression that she had attempted to overcome. Against 
Bach’s method our approach has not cast out identity but actively encour-
aged movement in identity through “fantasy.” Thus a  new approach to 
interpreting the Hebrew Bible recognizing the problem of identity was de-
veloped in re-reading Proverbs 31. However, this approach is not the only 
way to read the passage and no matter how close reading we take we could 
never prevent someone from taking women here as a universal. Hence re-
reading the Bible, to take new and creative interpretations, is an inherently 
problematic task. Kristeva’s proposal to allow the Bible to affect our “fan-
tasies and interpretative delirium” also falls short. The tradition of bib-
lical interpretation cannot be overcome in one movement. However, we 
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should be wary of this leading into a cynicism of accepting the traditional 
interpretation because this fails to grasp the ambivalence of the semiotic/
symbolic bind. Instead, the Bible stands, as it were, between the resonance 
of communal language and the excitement of a new possibility.
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